аЯрЁБс>ўџ Y[ўџџџXџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџьЅС#` №П6`bjbjЁЁ .lУУ6XџџџџџџЄЄЄЄЄЄЄЄИќќќќ ИВ Ж000000001 3 3 3 3 3 3 $hhаBW Є_00__W ЄЄ00l Й Й Й _ZЄ0Є01 Й _1 Й Й ЄЄЙ 0$ а@?5Љ_ЪќЙ аЙ 1 ‚ 0В Й ‰ Й ЄЙ x0>n,Й š$ОЁ000W W — "000В ____ИИИDќИИИќИИИЄЄЄЄЄЄџџџџ External Borders Somehow, in the deep recesses of darkness and void that have filled the universe in the vast and mute eons of its history, a brightness flared up that illuminated some stretch of this vast blackness. Whether it was a unique event and why it happened are less important than the fact that it happened at least once,, in the sensitive convoluted folds of the brain of homo sapiens, there arose representation systems that flared up, beheld a vast and limpid model and could declare: “This is our universe.” We have brains that receive information from at least five different kinds of inputs and somehow can manage to schematize these vast spaces, these dense masses, these massive energies and say: “We understand this.” It’s fantastic, this ability of such a convoluted system to grasp such a massive mystery and say: “We can understand this, we can see through it with our concepts.” It’s fantastic even if we rarely ask ourselves what fantastic things this means our concepts must be. There was, I think, no greater example of this limpidity then Newtonian physics. In this paper, I assume that the model of Newtonian physics, and particularly the kind of causality such a model employs, gives expression to a normative ideal of Western thinking and perhaps of human though in general. I imagine the normative force that I’m talking about through the image of the Anaxagorean mind, a force mixed in with other kinds of matter but that wants to colonize matter by separating itself out and regarding matter as something that it can decode, and by decoding it, control: set in motion and understand. I’ll return to this notion of colonization in a bit. Perhaps there can be more shining exemplar of transparent comprehensibility, that dream of opticians enamored of sharper images, bigger lenses, brighter lights. And this system! For so long we could imagine that it was explanatorily basic. We could dream of reductionism, which you could never prove was not theoretically possible. It allowed us to preserve the fiction of an immaterial mind, an absolute time, a heart beating at the center of a universe to the same time as ours. Then came the darknesses of the 20th century. From both directions, it became increasingly difficult to maintain that this transparency was a property of the universe considered apart from our bright eyes. On the macro level, we discovered that there was no absolute time apart from the temporality of things. We wanted to believe that world time was the same as our own time, but then we discovered that there was no such thing at all as universal world time. Things were no better on the micro-level, where time and causality behaved even more strangely. Here, we discovered the thresholds of comprehensibility and regularity. Regardless of how lawfully and regularly things behaved at or above the atomic level, it turned out to be the case that this regularity was in fact the result of apparently chaotic and random behavior below the atomic level. The fact that we have not yet found a theory that accounts for these two very different kinds of challenges yet, perhaps more importantly, that we are still able to describe the insights that we uncover mathematically, gives us some encouragement.that we will be able to recover or return the transparency of the world to our minds. Rather bizarre phenomena like strange entanglement seem --- but I emphasize only seem --- to provide us with a reason for hoping this recovery has already begun. Strange entanglement refers to an odd way in which certain subatomic particles can exhibit instantaneous co-ordinated behavior. 2 atoms can be linked together in such a way that even when they are later separated, they will continue to exhibit the same property. Let’s say, for example that we are describing a particular property of atoms in terms of color. Let’s say that a certain atom can be red or green. Now, it happens that we can’t know which one it is until we observe it, at which point its color becomes fixed. So we’ll call it’s color prior to that gray. Now, I might think that it is already red or green but I just don’t know which one until I observe it. But Bell’s theorem has shown that this isn’t true. In fact, it is gray prior to observation, at which point it will become red or green (this has to do with collapsing wave functions although the exact mechanisms aren’t important right now). Let’s say, further that there’s an equal chance of a particle becoming red or green at the time of observation. If I link 2 atoms but then split them up, I’d expect that each particle’s behavior would be independent, since each is its own random event. Thus, I’d expect that half the time one would become red and one green, М of the time they’d both become green and М of the time they’d both become red. But in strange entanglement what I observe is that they both always become the same color. Thus half the time they both become red and half the time they both become green. Now, it’s true that such a phenomenon should --- and does --- trouble both relativists and quantum mechanics. This should be particularly troubling for relativity because relativity shows that there can be no sense of the “same” time beyond the possibility of causation, that the fastest kind of causation is communication taking place at the speed of light and that the laws of causation (and therefore time) are drastically changed as we approach the speed of light. And yet, when we observe the two “entangled” particles, we can retrospectively find that the co-ordination between them was instantaneous. They went from being “gray” to both being red or green instantaneously, which implies that there was something like “communication” happening faster than the speed of light. On the other hand, orthodox quantum mechanics held that the behavior of each particle is independent, even if large aggregates of such behavior would probabilistically exhibit some kind of statistically regular pattern. And yet we discover that the behavior or one particle is dependent on the behavior of the other. So there are certainly some puzzles. But I don’t want to overstate the difficulty either. I’ve been assured by physicists that if you just stick to doing the math, you can get a sense of how these particles behave without their paradoxicality rearing its ugly head. (I might give an admittedly imperfect analogy to the way that one can do calculus without constantly invoking the idea of infinity.) Even more to the point, the challenge to the results we might expect from previous quantum mechanical and relativistic theory might give us hope for a restoration of the strictly causal and unified model Newtonian physics has provided. Now, I am perfectly aware that both Bell’s Theorem and the phenomenon of Strange Entanglement are important, but by no means uniquely important to theoretical physics working on the problem of the so called Grand Unification Theory. But that’s not precisely what I have in mind. What I’m more interested in is how the hope for this mathematical solution seems to revive certain metaphysical assumptions that are concomitant with the strong normative experience that I’d attach to the theory of Newtonian physics. In the case of quantum mechanics, it suggests a less random theory than we had at first been led to believe. The behavior of atoms is linked in regular patterns that exhibit less variation than the randomness of quantum mechanics would make us believe. On the other hand, the fact that these two particles seem to communicate faster than the speed of light suggests a time more absolute than relativity allows, one much more suggestive of traditional Newtonian temporality. While the phenomenon of strange entanglement might pose a problem to our math it also holds out the promise of extending the reach of our Newtonian colony, finding more firm causation and more absolute temporality where we thought we could not. Are we seeing ways in which the vague borders of our model at the utmost thresholds of our universe are starting to sharpen themselves, to delineate the sort of causality that our minds are so enamored of? Are we seeing the mysterious ding an sich yield to the force of our colonizing minds? Internal Borders Perhaps, but I don’t think that this is the only way we need to understand the phenomenon of strange entanglement. To see what other possibilities reveal themselves, we need to turn from the external borders that quantum and macro physical phenomena represent to a border internal to the style of thinking embodied in Newtonian physics. Whatever we might say of the claim that a causal model like the Newtonian one exhibits a normative force for us, it certainly does from within the ideology of the Enlightenment. Now I hope it’ll be clear that I don’t mean anything pejorative by bringing in the ideology of the Enlightenment. It is, as far as ideologies go, not a bad one. But whether or not we want to say that the kind of strict mechanical causation, fully expressible comprehensibility and absolute, linear time that the Newtonian model expresses is implicitly universally a goal of human thinking, it certainly became expressed as such a universal goal in the cultural world of the Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment West. Take the now abandoned largely abandoned project of reductionism. Reductionism expressed the hope that the other natural sciences and eventually the humanistic sciences could be assimilated to the Newtonian model as higher-order but essentially similar kinds of phenomena. To be sure, many thinkers in the humanistic sciences went along with this project enthusiastically and sought to colonize themselves and their disciplines to the Newtonian model, formalizing and idealizing the objects of their inquiry, mathematizing the relations between these objects and trying to rely only on mechanistic causation or, more recently, statistical correlation, the red-headed step-child of mechanistic causation. But there were some natives in the Western sciences who resisted this project of internal colonization, who insisted that reductionism missed the point not because it was not yet accomplished but because the phenomena being examined were not constituted on the model of Newtonian physics. Ah, such antiquated and antiquarian dreams! What kinds of thinking did they preserve on their arid reservations within the academy? Can we find there anything useful for our ways of thinking? Let’s look briefly at 2 closely related natives, Martin Heidegger and Hans-Georg Gadamer. Gadamer’s defense of the humanistic sciences in the discipline of hermeneutics is the more famous, but I’ll start with a lesser known point in the work of his teacher Martin Heidegger. Heidegger’s understanding of the sciences went through a number of shifts, from a quasi-Kuhnian modernist view of fundamental ontology and regional ontologies in his early phenomenological work to the deeply pessimistic critique of technological thinking in his later thinking. Both of these are fairly well traversed paths, but along that itinerary he sketched out a different understanding, and I want to begin with that detour. In the late 1930s he began working on a book that he hoped would be the Being and Time of his later career. He never finished it, but it was published posthumously as the Contributions to Philosophy. There, he suggests that what distinguishes different sciences is not the idea of nested regional ontologies within a broader, general ontology but rather that all sciences, all forms of knowing posit irreducibly different ontologies. Rather than looking at mathematizability as the hallmark of the modern natural sciences, as he had started to do earlier and as his teacher Edmund Husserl had done, he suggested instead that the key difference between different kinds of objects was the extent to which their objects admitted of rigor in formulation. Whereas the criterion of mathematizability suggests a particular kind of idealizability, posits that all sciences deal with idealized objects and therefore makes idealization the subject of general ontology, by focusing on how the objects under consideration admit of rigor, Heidegger moves in a materialistic direction. Entities exhibit an ambiguity, and by this point in his thinking Heidegger wants to make that ambiguity a positive feature of thought rather than a limit. With some kinds of entities this ambiguity can be dialed down and they can be grasped in a rigorous fashion. But some kinds of entities require a different sort of embrace. The ideology of the Enlightenment might experience this requirement as a limitation but it does not have to be. It can also be a positive feature for different kinds of rational or poetic explorations. As I mentioned, Heidegger does not finish the Contributions and in his later work he is much more pessimistic about the sciences. So this idea never gets fully worked out. We do see a related idea worked out much more fully in his student, Hans-Georg Gadamer’s phenomenological hermeneutics. In Truth and Method, Gadamer insists that there is a fundamental chasm between the natural sciences and the humanistic sciences. The reason why the humanistic sciences cannot be colonized by the model of Newtonian physics is because that model employs a linear way of thinking about time and because that linear way of thinking does not allow us to think about the importance of the thinker, observer or interpreter. In the humanistic sciences, the objects under consideration are constituted through play: we are dealing with open-ended entities and they are only completely constituted in the act of interpretation. This requires us to rethink the notion of temporality because a linear model cannot explain my interpretation of these open-ended entities. They are only completed through interpretation, which depends upon anticipating a future through play; the possibilities of this future, the rules of the game, are given by the past. But I only discover the past in interpretation. Thus, the relation between the present and the past and future has to be construed as an evolving relationship with an evolving past and future rather than as a now-point on a linear time where the past is a fixed cause and the future is the inexorable effect of that cause. So, if Gadamer is correct, hermeneutics gives me an account for why the colonizing efforts of reductionists within the humanistic sciences will necessarily fail. It sets up a safe haven for other kinds of thinking but it does this by denying the possibility of fundamental contact. And this is unfortunate in a different way. Colonization isn’t all bad --- the contact and give and take has been fantastic for cuisine, for example. I’m only partially joking. To be brief, let me simply suggest that Gadamerian hermeneutics has essentially served like a reservation within the academy, a place where a pre-colonized form of life has been preserved but only at the cost of a certain stagnation, by denying the contact with an outside which is an essential part of all open-ended systems. What I want to focus on with my remaining time is the possibility that unbeknownst to us, we have preserved within this internal colony of the academy a kind of ontology of that will be more helpful to understanding a phenomenon like strange entanglement than the linear model that the hope for a Grand Unification theory still employs as a latent ideal and that ought to be liberated into scientific discourse. To understand what I mean by this, it’s important to remind ourselves that relativity and quantum-mechanics experience the limitations of the Newtonian model in different ways. Relativity turns out to be a necessary consequence of the extension of Newtonian thought once we understand that space and time are not external to the system of matter and energy, in other words once we accept that frames of reference are irreducible. Relativity can to a certain degree be thought of as a relative absolutism within given frames of reference. So perhaps we can understand strange entanglement by introducing new frames of reference, new dimensions of space-time where the behavior of these phenomena can be seen to be regular and predictable. In contrast, quantum-mechanics seems to pose a more fundamental challenge because it suggests that the nature of causation is less fixed than we want. Nonetheless, when we make this fixity dependent upon the observer we end up positing a subjective kind of causation in the way that subjectivisms have always played with and compensated for objectivisms in idealized systems. And this can be made at least somewhat palatable to Newtonian thought by showing that even observation is a material process and that at the quantum level we are dealing with phenomena so tiny that the tiny materials of observation interfere with them. So we can posit a virginal Ding-an-sich in terms of potentiality even if we know that our observation will only ever allow us to know it after its violation (note that I am pointing out that the consequences of quantum mechanics are already present in the Kantian rehabilitation of rationalistic metaphysics). We can still understand this contact on a linear model, even if we have to acknowledge that we have injected ourselves into the process more than we’d like to admit. We can then understand strange entanglement through the act of observation, showing by retrospective observation and comparison of two separate expiremental apparatuses that observation made something happen the effects of which introduced an actuality in two places where once there had been potentiality. I’m not saying that either of these approaches is wrong. I’m suggesting however that they exhibit an unnecessary awkwardness because they continue to posit the necessity of what is in fact a contingent norm. Our discourse may be straining at the limits of experience but we can still employ the normative rules of our discourse in trying to describe this and that we try to do this because they seem to be necessary to what we regard scientific discourse to be. It seems however, that another model is available on the reservation of hermeneutics if we are simply willing to accept that there might be a hermeneutics of natural history. Gadamer’s defense of the humanistic sciences by positing a chasm between the two domains allowed us to preserve such a way of thinking, but it is less helpful in helping us cross the chasm. Heidegger’s insight however points out that this chasm is not, strictly speaking, real. Entities admit of rigor to different degrees, but this is not a vast qualitative difference. All ontologies deal with ambiguity --- perhaps in physics we are usually able to dial this ambiguity down, but we are not so lucky at the quantum level. If this is true, then the application of ways of thinking that have attuned themselves to this ambiguity and made it productive for them is a natural step --- it is not a leap over a chasm at all. Even when quantum mechanics allows that there is no strict deterministic actuality prior to my observation and makes possibility and ambiguity a feature of the model in the past of my observation, it regards deterministic actuality as essential to there being knowledge. In fact, this does not follow. By pointing out that the potentiality which was there in the object is discovered in the observation as much as the act that follows, hermeneutics points out that I am entering into a productive relationship to the past as much as the future. The present is the point of both of these contacts. We have a relationship to the past that proceeds our observation, we merely uncover it in observation. What we do not have is access to the past as something that we’ve already gotten our dirty little hands on. Maybe we should give up on that desire. I’m speaking in metaphors, I admit. That’s what happens when you make the mistake of letting a philosopher of art talk about science. But let me end by offering 2 concrete recommendations: 1) We really ought take our role as observers even more seriously than quantum mechanics does. We need to recognize that there are multiple points of contact. If I can know that 2 particles change instantaneously it’s because there can be multiple observers and these multiple observers can retrospectively compare their results to one another and to other observers whose different experiments have established different points of contact. As far as I can tell, quantum modeling still employs the fiction that this retrospective observation can happen instantaneously. Perhaps that fiction is in our heads. By calling it a fiction, I don’t mean to denigrate it. I think we should acknowledge and honor the role of fiction and imagination in scientific reasoning. 2) Once we accept that fiction, then we should allow something like backward causation into our system of observation at the quantum level. This backwards causation will not have the same logic as mechanistic causation, however. It will rather seek to describe the fact that we understand the past through our observation of the present and so that the past that we encounter as potentiality is a productive part of the system that we had regarded as deterministic. Actuality is shot through with potentiality. So this backwards causation will not be backwards mechanistic thinking, which is essentially how we have understood teleology in Christian and post-Christian metaphysics --- on this model, teleology is the desire to be able to control the processes of mechanistic causality. Rather, it will be the desire to let something come from that outside, a desire more akin to what is expressed in Aristotelian teleology. There, teleology was a function of how things in the natural world expressed the longings that constituted them and impelled their movement. When our souls looked at the stars they strove to meet them. This striving set our reason into motion. Backwards causation is less the desire for control than it is love. When we love something we want to let it be but to be along with it. To love quantum particles is to let them be what they are, pure potentiality, but to let themselves come into contact and to express themselves to us as what they also are, pure actuality. That only sounds like a paradox if you’ve never been in love. 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